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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SIDNEY M. HORMAN and
THEODORE HORMAN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
-V-

LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, and GALAXY OUTDOOR
ADVERTISING, INC.,
Defendants-Respondents.

Case No.
10933

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE
Appellants initiated suit against respondent, Liquor
Control Commission of Utah, wherein appellants sought
to obtain an appropriate writ requiring and ordering
respondent Liquor Control Commission of Utah to revoke a regulation of respondent Liquor Control Commission of Utah which authorizes the advertising of light
beer on billboards. This regulation is known and identified as Regulation No. 4.

I

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Subsequent to the filing of appellants' complaint,
respondent Galaxy Outdoor Advertising, Inc., sought and
obtained leave to intervene as a party defendant. Thereafter, respondent Liquor Control Commission of Utah
filed a motion for judgment on the pleading which was
denied by the lower court and answers were thereupon
filed by both respondents.
Appellants moved for summary judgment and at the
hearing of appellants' motion for summary judgment,
respondents orally moved for summary judgment. Respondents' oral motion for summary judgment was made
without objection by appellants. The lower court denied
appellants' motion for summary judgment and granted
respondents' motion for summary judgment.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents submit that the granting of respond- .
ents' motion for summary judgment should be affirmed. i
!

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Pursuant to the authority vested in respondent I
Liquor Control Commission of Utah, hereinafter referred I
to a:s the "commission," by Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann..
M 11 00 1
§ 32-1-7 (1966) the commission, on or about l1 arc ~· ·
1966, promulga~ed a regulation known and identified as
Regulation No. 4, wherein it was provided:
2

A. Alcoholic beverages, excluding light beer
shall not be advertised in anv manner which
is contrary to section 32-7-27, Utah Code Annotatd 1953.

B. Light beer may be advertised in any reasonabl manner consistent with the public interest
subject to the following conditions:
'
( 1) The approval of the commission must first be
obtained for every form of advertising display
or method which utilizes family pets, family
scenes, drinking scenes or which the advertiser
has reason to believe Yrnuld be deemed contrary
to the public interest by the commission. In such
an event, the advertiser 'Shall submit to the commission a speciment [sic] of the proposed or disapprove the same. If approved, no published
advertisement shall contain any statement of
approval by the commission.

( 2) The commission will not approve any advertising proposal, sign, display, system or method
which alludes to minors, or which is inconsistent
with good taste or public morals.
(3) On order of the commission any sign, display or advertisement which the commission shall
consider objectionable or contrary to the public
intereist, shall be removed.
Prior to the promulgation of Regulation No. 4, the
commission operated under the following regulation:
All advertising of alcoholic beverages, including
light beer, on billboards,. sign b.oard~, road s~gns,
painted bulletins, electric or ~llummate~ :sign~,
or on or in any form of exterior advert1smg is
hereby prohibited except as provided in 32-7-27
Utah Code Annotated 1953, and in these regula-
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tio1!-s· The tenn 'exterior advertising' is construed
t? mclude an~ advertising, displayed or set outside the prenuses or at. any. place within , upo nor
a tt ach ed to t_he pre1mses if the same is visible
from the outside, and the regulations herein promulgated are intended to cover all such advertising.
The issues presented by the instant case are whether
the appellants have standing to challenge the validity
of Regulation No. 4, and, in the event the first issue
is resolved in favor of appellants, whether Regulation
No. 4 is a valid exercise of the statutory authority conferred on the commission by the Utah State Legislature.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELILANTS HAVE NO STANDING TO
CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF THE
REGULATION PRO~IULGATED BY THE
LIQUOR CONTROL COMMISSION OF UTAH
AUTHORIZING THE ADVERTISING OF
LIGHT BEER ON BILLBOARDS PURSUANT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS.
Respondent submits that Regulation No. 4 is a valid
exercise of the discretion vested in the commission by
the Utah State Legislature. However, before the validity
of the authority of the commission to promulgate such
a regulation may be considered, it is jurisdictionally
mandatory that consideration be given to the standing of
appellants to challenge the action of the commission.
A basic tenet in American jurisprudential procedure
is that before a party may challenge the actions of an
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administrative agency, that party must be vested with
"standing to sue." As stated in 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrntive Law ~ 575, at 393 (1962) :
One o~ t~e ~octrines or standards which operates
as ~ 1Im1ta~101~ ~1pon ~he availability of judicial
review or Judicial relief against administrative
action is 'standing to sue.'
It is further stated at 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative
Law ~ 575, at 395 (1962) :

A complainant's interest must be some special
and peculiar personal interest directly and materially affected by the alleged unlawful action,
and an interest which is not different in legal
character from that of citizens and taxpayers in
general may be held insufficient. 'Where a particular objectionable feature does not operate to
the prejudice of the complainant he may be held
to be without interest to raise a question as to
such matter.
This doctrine is further illustrated by Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288 (1943), .wherein the United States Supreme Court considered the actions of the Secretary of
Agriculture in establishing minimum prices for classes
of milk with an additional requirement that a milk handler in a designated area could not pay less than the
minimum prices to the producers. In discussing the issue
of "standing to sue," the Court held at 321 U.S. 304:

It is only when a complainant possesses something more than a general int~re~t in the. ~roper
execution of the law that he 1s m a pos1t10n to
secure judicial intervention. His interest m~st
rise to the dignity of an interest personal to 111m
and not possessed by the people generally.

5
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The elements of standing to sue are as established ,
· ·
a~
e prmc1ple. As stated by the Supreme Court of Cali.
fornia in Flora Crane Service, Inc. v. Ross, 390 P.2d
193, 196 (Cal. 1964) :
th

.... ~hos~ requirements are (1) a clear and present
mu;nstenal duty of the defendant to do an act
wh1c~ the law_ spec~fically enjoins and (2) a substantial beneficial mterest of the plantiff in the
performance of that duty. . . .
This court has also considered the elements of standing to sue and in Bishop v. Moorehouse, 38 Utah 234, 112
Pac. 169 (1910), it was held at 38 Utah 237:
Then our inquiry must be ( 1) whether the plaintiff is clearly entitled to what he demands; and
(2) whether it is clearly the duty of the defendants to act. . . .
The position announced by this court in Bishop v.
Moorehouse, supra, and adhered to in Snyder v. Emerson~ 19 Utah 319, 57 Pac. 300 (1899); Woodcock v. Bd. of
Educ. of Salt Lake City, 55 Utah 458, 187 Pac. 181,
10 A.L.R. 181 (1920); Towler v. Warenski, 59Utah171,
202 Pac. 37 4 (1921) ; is the view taken by the majority of
the courts. Baltimore Retail Liquor Package Stores
Ass'n v. Kerng.ood, 189 A. 209 (Md. 1937); Grey v. Jet1r
kins, 183 Kan. 251, 326 P.2d 319 (1958).
Examples of a proper determination that the plain·
tiff entertained a peculiar interest in the actions of the
administrative agency and was therefore vested with
standing to sue are: United States v. Storer Broadcast·
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i11g Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956), wherein it was held that
the regulations of the Federal Communications Commission operated to control the business affairs of the
plaintiff and unless plaintiff was allowed to obtain a
modification of the administrative policy, enlargement
of plaintiff's standard of FM stations could not be obtained; Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123 (1951), wherein the plaintiff was allowed to
bring an action for removal of the plaintiff's name from
the United States Attorney General's list of subversive
or communist organizations; Columbia Broadcasting
System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942), wherein
it was determined that irreparable injury to plaintiff's
business would occur if plaintiff was not allowed to
challenge the validity of the Federal Communications
Commission regulation.
In all instances, the administrative action was considered to produce an adverse or prejudicial affect on
the aggrieved party before that party was determined to
be vested with standing to sue. It is obvious that no
such affect may be alleged or claimed by appellants in
the instant case.

Respondent submits, therefore, that appellants have
no standing to challenge the validity of Regulation No. 4.
Appellants have not and may not allege a unique or
peculiar interest in the validity of Regulation No. 4, nor
may appellants allege a unique or peculiar damage
through the promulgation of Regulation No. 4.
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POINT II
THE ISSUANCE OF AN APPROPRIATE
WRIT IN THE NATURE OF A WRIT OF
MANDAMUS AS SOUGHT BY APPELLANTS IS NOT JUSTIFIED OR PROPER
UNDER ·THE FACTS OF THE INSTANT
CASE.
Appellants seek to secure the issuance of an "appropriate writ" in the nature of a writ of mandamus whereby
respondent commission would be compelled to revoke
Regulation NO·. 4. However, several factors negate the
propriety of the issuance of such a writ in the instant
case.
In Cope v. Toronto, 8 Utah 2d 255, 332 P.2d 977
(1958), this court held that Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(3)
is merely a restatement of the established and recognized definitions of the purpose of a writ of mandamus
and that the rule is to be confined to its literal meaning.
The philosophy and policies announced by this court
prior to the adoption of Utah R. Civ. P. would properly
apply to matters in the nature of mandamus proceedings
arising since the adoption of Utah R. Civ. P.
Respondent commission submits that the promulgation of a regulation such as Regulation No. 4 is a matter
of sound administrative discretion. It is well established
that the element of discretion, as applied to the actions
and policies of an administrative agency, negates the
applicability of a mandamus proceeding to control '.he
actions and policies established by an administrative
agency. Tuttle v. Bd. of Ediic. of Salt Lake City, 77 Utah
270, 294 Pac. 294 (1930).
8

This court has also adopted the position that unless
the act sought to be compelled through mandamus is
clear and one which the law especially enjoins as a duty,
the relief must be denied. Mammoth City v. Snow, 69
Utah 204, 253 Pac. 680 (192G); Bishop v. illoorehouse,
supra. In the instant case, no clear statutory duty justifies the issuance of a writ of mandate against the commission. Rather, Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-27
(1966), by the plain and clear meaning of the language
of that section permits such advertising.
Appellants refer to a "specific duty" on the part
of the commission to prohibit billboard advertising of
light beer. However, in Startup v. Hannon, 59 Utah 329,
203 Pac. 637 (1921), this court stated, 59 Utah at 332:
The language of the statute quoted near the beginning of our statement of the case is plain, unequivocal and unambiguous. It needs no interpretation to determi1u' the fact that a mandatory
didy is imposed upon the county oommissioners
to provide such funds as may be reasonably necessary to carry out the purposes of the law in
accordance ·with its express terms and provisions.
This being the case, it is a positive duty of the
commissioners to provide the funds without equivocation or evasion. [Emphasis added.]
Also, in Crockett v. Bd. of Editc. of Carbon County
School Dist., 58 Utah 303, 199 Pac. 158 (1921), and
Archer v. State Land Board, 15 Utah 2d 321, 392 P.2d
622 (1964), a clear statutory obligation and duty was
imposed on the defendants. In each case cited by appellants, the statute was clear and unequivocal. However,
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in the instant case, respondent submits that (1) Repl.
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-27 (1966), does not specifically prohibit the type of controlled advertising of light
beer on billboards permitted by Regulation No. 4, and
(2) Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-27 (1966), by the
plain and clear meaning of the language of that section
'
permits such advertising.
In considering both the standing of appellants to
challenge the validity of Regulation No. 4 and also the
propriety of the relief sought by appellants, it is necessary to note that appellants' authorities do not support
their contentions. For example, appellants' reference
to 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administr,ative Law§ 575, at 395 (1962),
completely ignores the fact that the section specifically
provides that individual rights must depend on the performance of a duty.
Also, appellants fail to recognize the proposition
contained in 35 Am. Jur. Mandamus § 320, at 74 (1941),
wherein it is stated:
But acts of public officers which could not injure
the petitioner in any way will not furnish him
ground for complaint.
In summary, respondent submits that appellants'
application for mandamus is without support because
of the absence of any adverse affect on appellants
through the promulgation of Regulation No. 4, and because of the lack of any clear, specific statutory duty
on the commission to refrain from the promulgation of
such a regulation.
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POINT III
THE UTAH STATE SUPREME COURT IN

BIRD & JEX CO. V. FUNK, 9G UTAH 450, 885
P.2D 831 (1939), DID NOT DISPOSE OF THE

ISSUES PRESENTED BY THIS APPEAL.

A. THE CASE OF BIRD & JEX CO. V.
FUNK, SUPRA, DOES NOT SUPPORT

APPELLANTS' CONTENTIONS.
B.

THE FACTS INVOLVED IN BIRD

& JEX CO. V. FUNK, SUPRA, ARE DIA-

METRICALLY OPPOSED TO THE
FACTS PRESENTED IN THE INSTANT CASE.

C. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT
THE CASE OF BIRD & JEX CO. V.
FUNK, SUPRA, MAY BE INTERPRETED AS ALLEGED BY APPELLANTS
AND THAT THE CASE DOES SUPPORT APPELLANTS' CONTENTIONS,
THE CASE SHOULD BE OVERRULED
BY THIS COURT.
A.

THE CASE OF BIRD & JEX CO. V. FUNK,
SUPRA, DOES NOT SUPPORT APPELLANTS' CON'l'ENTIONS.
A brief recitation of the facts involved in Bird &
Jex Co. v. Fmik, supra, would serve to isolate the issues

of that case and reveal the actual position taken by this
court. The case involved an action to restrain the enforcement of regulations of the commission that prohibited the advertisement of light beer on billboards.
The plaintiff alleged that the last provision of Utah
Laws 1935, ch. 43, ~ 140, at 76, which is identical to the
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last proviso contained in Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
~ 32-7-27 (1966), compelled the commis:sion to authorize
the advertisement of light beer on billboards. The plaintiff contended that, because of the last proviso of the
applicable statute, the commission could not prohibit
the advertisement of light beer on billboards, but could
only promulgate regulation authorizing such advertising.
The defendant commission filed a general demurrer
which was sustained by the lower court. This court
stated at 85 P.2d 834:
The only question to be determined at the moment
is: Granting the constitutionality of the Liquor
Control Act, and particularly sections 7 and 140
(quoted above), docs the Liquor Control Commission have the power to prohibit billboard advertising in the face of the last proviso in Section
140. [Emphasis added.]
This court concluded that, notwithstanding the last
proviso of the applicable statute, the commi:ssion could
prohibit the advertisement of light beer on billboards and
was not bound to promulgate merely permissive regulations.
Respondent submits that if the question involved in
the instant case was the same as that involved in Bird
& Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, i.e., if the commission had not
revoked the prior regulation and appellants were now
seeking to compel the commission to authorize the advertising of light beer on billboards, the case of Bird &!ex
Co. v. Funk, supra, would be applicable and controlhn~.
However, in the instant case, appellants seek to restr~in
the commission from exercising that which the conunis-
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sion submits to be the discretionary authority vested in
the commision by the Utah State Legislature. The case
of Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, does not stand for
the proposition that the commission cannot exercise administrative discretion and permit the advertising of
light beer of billboards pursuant to the regulations of the
commission. Rather, this court merely upheld the exercise of administrative discretion by the commission to
totally prohibit such advertising notwithstanding the last
proviso of the applicable statute.
A basic distinction must be made between the duty
of the commission to authorize such advertising as considered in Bird & Jex Co. v. Fitnk, supra, and the discretionary power of the commission to permit such advertising. Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, holds that the
commission is under no duty to permit such advertising,
but does not hold that the commission is without discretionay authority to permit such advertising.
In Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, the court was concerned with a definition of the duties and powers of the
commission and thus concluded that, unless an area had
been specifically excluded from the jurisdiction of the
commission by the Utah State Legislature, the commission was vested with complete power and control to
manage the liquor monopoly on behalf of the State. This
aspect of complete control supports the conclusion that
the commission is vested with a wide latitude of discretionary powers as against specifically imposed duties.
This court further stated at 85 P.2d 836:
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B:u~e. (m) of_ the Commis~ion is in effect a pro.
h1b:hon of hillhoard nnd G'gn udvc•rtising of alcoholic
beverages, inclndino·
li bo·ht beer. The vr 101ll.
.
b
m1ss10~ . wm~ld have. no right to prohibit such
adverhsm~ if by ~eg1slative act such advertising
were permitted. Such, however, is not the case
and ~u_le ( m) is bif:t a re-assertion of the specifi~
P'.o~ision of Sectwn 140 irhich effectively prohibits such advertising. [Emphasis added.]
Respondent submits that the Liquor Control Act
does not, in and of itself, permit the advertising of light
beer on billboards. Rather, the Liquor Control Act vests
in the commission the discretionary power to either prohibit such advertising or permit such advertising pursuant to the regulations of the commission.
Again, the distinction must be drawn between the
duty of the commission and the vested power of the
commission. If the Liquor Control Act specifically permitted such advertisement, the commission, of course, ,
could not prohibit the advertisement. It would then be
the duty of the commission to permit such advertisement
in the first instance and act merely as a regulatory
body. A conclusion that the commission is not duty bound
to permit the advertisement of light beer on billboards
does not necessitate or justify a conclusion that the
commission is without power to permit such advertisement pursuant to its regulations.
This interpretation is further supported by the state·
ment of the court at 85 P.2d 836:
It is contended that the use of the word 'shall'
indicates an intent of the legislature that adver·
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tising of light beer is authorized by the act. In
view of the evident purposes of the act and the
wording of the other parts of section 140 we
are of the view that the word 'shall' should be
construed as merely permissive. [Emphasis added.]
Respondent agrees that the last proviso of the statute should be construed as permissive. This obviously
vests in the commission the discretionary power to elect
to prohibit the advertisement of light beer on billboards
or permit the advertisement of light beer on billboards.
In other words, the advertising of light beer on billboards
shall be permitted once the commission exercises its
discretionary power to authorize such advertisement.
Once this discretion is exercised, the advertisement
is subject to such regulation as the commission may
make. Therefore, the Liquor Control Act alone does not
permit the advertisement of light beer on billboards, but
vests the choice of prohibition or permission in the comm1ss10n.
Appellants submit that the following statement by the
court in Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, supports their
position that the issues presented by the instant case
were decided by the case. The court stated at 85 P.2d 837:
Holding as we do, that billboard and other outdoor display advertising is prohibited by the Act,
the appellants are in no position to question the
validity of the other regulations adopted. by the
Commission, and for that reason we refram from
passing on them.
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Respondent submits that Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.
§ 32-7-27 (1966), which is identical to the statutory provisions considered by the court in Bird & Jex Co. v. Fitnk
supra, sets forth the general prohibition against adver'.
tisement of alcoholic beverages under certain specified
conditions. However, respondent also submits that the
advertisement of light beer on billboards may be permitted by the commission pursuant to the statutory authority contained in the last proviso of Repl. Vol. Utah
Code Ann. § 32-7-27 ( 1966). The "holding" submitted
by appellants to support their position must be interpreted to be that because the Liquor Control Act generally prohibited the advertising of light beer on billboards, and, because the regulation of the commission
was but a mere reassertion of this general prohibition,
it necessarily followed that the commission was under no
duty to allow such advertising. The regulation considered in Bird & Jex Co. v. F'imk, sitpra, being a mere
reassertion of the general prohibition contained in the
Liquor Control Act, was held to be a valid exercise of
the discretionary power of the commission. The holding
of the Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, would be that the
commission was not duty bound to permit the advertising
of light beer on billboards notwithstanding the last pro·
viso of Utah Laws 1935, ch. 43, § 140 at 76.
B. THE FACTS INVOLVED IN THE CASE OF
BIRD & JEX CO. V. FUNK, SUPRA, ARE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO THE FACTS PRESENTED
IN THE INSTANT CASE.

16

I

I
i

·

I
1

:
•
·

I
I

As noted above, in Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra,
the court was asked to determine whether the commission
was bound to authorize the advertising of light beer
on billboards notwithstanding the last proviso of Utah
Laws 1935, ch. 43, § 140, at 76. The court concluded that
no such duty existed on the part of the commission.
However, this conclusion is of no help in determining
whether the commission has the discretionary power to
permit such advertising.
Therefore, based on the distinctionable facts of the
instant case and Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, it may
not be said that a precedent exists in support of appellant's contentions.
C. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE CASE
OF BIRD & JEX CO. V. FUNK, SUPRA, MAY BE
INTERPRETED AS ALLEGED BY APPELLANTS
AND THAT THE CASE DOES SUPPORT APPELLANTS' CONTENTIONS, THE CASE SHOULD BE
OVERRULED BY THIS COURT.
Respondent immediately concedes that the statute
considered by the court in Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra,
is identical with Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-27
(1966), which is the basic statute involved in the instant
case. However, respondent respectfully sumits that the
court, in Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, misconstrued
that statute to arrive at a result whereby the commission
would not be duty bound to permit the advertisement of
light beer on billboards. In considering the predecessor
to Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.§ 32-7-27 (1966), the court
stated at 85 P.2d 835:

17

Section
.b. .140 may be divided into four parts ' t,\\0
pro h_i _itions ~n~. two pr~visos as follows: (1) A
specific_ prohibition agamst billboard signs and
other displays; (2) A general prohibition of all
other advertising and all 'means of inducing per. .
sons to buy alcoholic beverages, or to enter places
w_here alc?h?lic be:erages are sold;' ( 3) A pro.
viso perm1ttmg a sign on the window or front of
authorized premises and limiting it to a simple
designation of the fact that beer or other beverage
is sold or manufactured; and (4) the proviso 'that
advertising of light beer shall be permitted under ,
such regulation as the commission may make.'
The court then concluded that the second proviso
was an exception carved out of the general prohibition
against all other forms of advertising but that the proviso did not affect the specific prohibition against billboard signs and other displays. Both the specific and
general prohibition referred to by the court in Bird &
Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, are found in the second sentence
of Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.§ 32-7-27 (1966), wherein
it is stated:
This provision shall be construed to prohibit ~he
use of anv electric or illuminated signs, contnv·
ance or d~vice, signboard, billboard, or other di~
play signs, and to prohibit the display of alcoholic
beverages or price lists in windows or show cases
visible to passersby, and to prohibit the use of a~Y
other means of inducing persons to buy alcoholic
beverages, or to enter places where alcoholic bev·
erages are sold....
Respondent submits that the construction placed ~n i
Utah Laws 1935, ch. 43, § 140, at 76, by the court in
Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, obviously violates the
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plain and clear wording and intent of the statute. Respondent contends that the second sentence of the statute
should be considered as instructional with the legislature
specifically directing the manner in which the entire
provision is to be interpreted. This instructionary sentence should not be considered a general and specific
prohibition in itself, but rather, merely a declaration of
legislative intent as to the proper manner of construction
to be given the provision.
Respondent's interpretation is exemplified by an
examination of the terminology and grammatical structure employed in the second sentence. For example, the
sentence specifically states "this provision shall be construed." This obviously is a specific directive by the
legislature as to the correct manner of interpretation to
be given in the entire provision. Also, the use of the
conjunctive "and" indicates that the prohibition aga,nst
advertising would include not only the forms of advertising specifically enumerated, but also, "any other means
of inducing persons to buy alcoholic beverages."
Respondent submits that a proper construction of
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-27 (1966) would be as
follows: The first sentence of Repl. Vol. U tab Code Ann.
~ 32-7-27 (1966), wherein it is stated, "the prohibition
against advertising alcoholic beverages and against window displays in liquor stores of the commission shall
apply in like manner to all manufacturers and licensees of
alcoholic beverages, and to packaged agencies ... " refers
to the prohibition against advertisement of alcoholic beverages by the commission contained in Repl. Vol. Utah
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Code. ~~11. ~ 32-7-26 (1966), and is intended to apply that
proh1b1hon to all manufacturers and licensees of alcoholic
beverages. The second sentence of Repl. Vol. Utah Code
Ann.~ 32-7-27 (1966), is a directive indicating the legislative intent as to the proper manner of construction of
the entire provision. The prohibition against advertising
would apply not only to the manners of advertising
specifically enumerated in the second sentence, but also
to ". . . any other means of inducing persons to buy
alcoholic beverages." The third sentence provides one
execption to the general prohibition against advertising
of alcoholic beverages in that, " ... the fact that beer,
wine, or other liquors are manufactured or sold under
authority derived from the commission may be placed
in or upon the window or front of the place of business
having such authority." The fourth sentence should be
construed as a proviso authorizing a further exception
to the general prohibition against advertisement of alcoholic beverages in that it is specifically provided, ".. ·
that advertising of light beer shall be permitted under
such regulation as the commission may make."
The last proviso, or the fourth sentence of Repl. Vol.
Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-27 (1966), should be given the
effect of removing light beer from the general prohibition against the advertising of alcoholic beverages.
Reference to the Liquor Control Act supports the
interpretation submitted by respondent. For example,
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.§ 32-1-3 (1966) provides:
· this
The following words and phrases use d 1Il
act shall have the following meaning, unless a
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different meaning clearly appears from the context:

'Alcoholic beverage' means and includes 'beer'
and 'liquor' as they are defined herein....
The general prohibition contained in Repl. Vol. Utah
Code Ann. § 32-7-27 (1966), against the advertisement
of alcoholic beverages would include, ordinarily, light
beer. However, by virtue of the last proviso of Repl.
Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-27 (1966), it clearly appears
that light beer is to be excluded from the general definition of alcoholic beverages. Therefore, the context of
Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-27 (1966), by specific
references, excludes light beer from the general definition of alcoholic beverages and the general prohibition
against advertising applicable to alcoholic beverages.
The statutory construction suggested by respondent
also construes the phrase "shall be permitted"' of the last
proviso of Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-27 (1966),
as vesting a permissive discretionary power in the commission. This permissive construction was conceded by
this court in Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra.
Another aspect of the interpretation submitted by
the respondent is that the interpretation gives a logical
construction to Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-27
(1966). The construction placed on Utah Laws 1935,
ch. 43, § 140, at 76, in Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra,
completely eliminated the effect intended by the legislature when the last proviso of Utah Laws 1935, ch. 43,
~ 140, at 76, was included, or tacked on to the statutory
provision.
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The logical conclusion of the interpretation of Bird
& Jev Co. v. Fitnk, sitpra, urged by appellant is that, in
dealing with light beer, the commission may only promulgate regulations prohibiting that which the statute has
already prohibited. This interpretation completely ignores the plain and clear meaning of the grammatical
construction and terminology employed by the legislature
in drafting Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann.§ 32-7-27 (1966).
It does not logically follow that the Utah State Legislature, by including the last proviso of Repl. Vol. utah
Code Ann. § 32-7-27 ( 1966), intended the commission to
be vested only with power to prohibit that which the
legislature had already prohibited.
Respondent, therefore, respectfully submits that the
construction of Utah Laws 1935, ch. 43, § 140, at 76,
adopted by this court in Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supro,
should be overruled and the construction submitted by
respondent adopted in the instant case.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that appellants are not vested
with standing to challenge the validity of Regulation No.
4. Also, the relief sought by appellants is improper in
that the basic prerequisities to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus are not present in the instant case.
The promulgation of Regulation No. 4 is a proper
exercise of the discretionary power vested in the cow·
6
mission by Repl. Vol. Utah Code Ann. § 32-7-27 (196 1;
.
Appellants' contentions
must f ai·1 b ecause of appellants
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sole reliance on Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, supra, which
is misinterpreted by appellants, inapplicable to the facts
of the instant case and a misconstruction of the statute
ronsidered in the case.
The granting of respondents motion for summary
judgment by the lower court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
GARY A. FRANK
Assistant Attorn0y General

Attorneys for Respondents
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